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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

BE'TH F. DRURY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

COLLEEN LUNCEFORD,

Defendant and Appellant.

I
(

)

CASE
NO. 10466

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE

Respondent agrees with appellant's statement of the
n<.:turc of the case.
DISPOSmON IN LOWER COURT

RPspondent agrees with the appellant's statement as to
disposition of the case in the lower court, except respond,'nt contends that the trial court at the conclusion
ol the C\ idence expressed the view that the judgment should
1
" ~;2 000.00 plus the special damages, and that the only
iudg1m,n1 granted was· the judgment signed by the court
't1'i Ucc! March 8, 1965.
th2

2
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Respondent agrees with the statement of f .
ads~·
forth by app2llant, except respondent contends th t · ''
a JUdg
ment was never awarded for $2,000.00 plus sp 2cial da!'ij.
ages of $126.20, but that there was only an exp""' ·
'""SSIO!l Of
opinion by the court as to this fact.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RECONSIDERING THE LAW AND THE FACTS BEFORE ENTERING JUDGMENT.

After the parties had presented evidence in the effort
to support their respective contentions and after the parties had completed argument to the Court, the Trial Judge
orally stated afteT considering the matter ten minutes, "I
think in view of the injuries, the judgment of $2,000.00
would be fair, plus the special damages orf One Hw1dred
and 'I\venty-six Dollars and Twenty Cents." (Tr. 37). The
Court thereafter, after fully considering the matter, issue<J
what is called a Reconsideration stating, " ... that plain·
tiff is entitled to recorver the sum of $4,800.00 general dam·
ages, plus special damages of $126.20, and costs." The
Court, on March 8, 1965, entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and the Judgment. The Utah Supreme
Court, in the case of McCoilum vs. Clothier, 121 U. 311.
241 P.2d 468, states, "No antecedent expression of the
trial judge can in any way restrict his absolute power to
declare his final conclusion in the only manner authorized
by law. to wit, by filing his decision, findings of fact, and
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, .w:lu::;ions of law." Two later Utah cases have cited Mccollum vs. Clothier, and have applied this principle. See
.Tohn c. Powers vs. Marvin F. Taylor, 14 U.2d 118, 378 P.2d
519. and Benner J. Carling vs. Industrial Commission of
Utah and Consolidated Western Steel Division, United
States Steel Corporation, 16 U.2d 260, 399 P.2d 202; also
see Phillips vs. Hooper, 111 P.2d 22, and Ritter vs. Johnson. 300 P. 518.
POINT II

11-IE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SETTING
.-1SIDE ITS UNCONDITIONAL ORDER GRANTING D&
FTNDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
Appellant in this matter contends that, ". . . it was
an irregularity in the proceedings in the action of the trial
judge announcing his oral decision from the bench on the
day of the trial and then two days later, on his own mottoo,
after having mulled the evidence over in his mind, and
reeonsidered the evidence and issues having increased the
general damages awarded . . . . " See appellant's brief,
Point IL Appellant, however, in the lower court did not
support her motion by an affidavit as required by Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(c).
The lower court specifically foond that there was not
':anse for a new trial as provided under Rule 59. The
trial court has no discretion to grant a new trial absent a
'~owing of one of the grounds specified in Rule 59. See
Tangaro vs. Manero, 13 U.2d 290, 373 P.2d 390.
RE>spondent admits that an order denying a new trial
i'' final in character and operates to terminate the trial
=urt's jurisdiction. An order granting a new trial is dif-

'
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ferent in character than an order denying one Th
•
·
e ordf•
denymg a new trial terminates the cause while .
.·
'
· an Order
granting a new trial operates to vacate the J'udgm t :
en an~
reinstate the case as one undisposed of before th
·
e court
over which it retains jurisdiction. See Bateman vs. Don~
van, 131 F.2d 759. The Bateman vs. Donovan case was
cited by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Nationa;
Farmer's Union Property and Casualty Company vs. u,.
land J. Thompson, 4 U.2d 7, 286 P.2d 249, wherein the
Court approved the setting aside of a conditional order
granting a new trial.
POINT III

THE DAMAGES GRANTED BY
COURT WERE NOT EXCESSIVE.

THE LOWER

An action for injury to one's person because of the
negligent act of another is an action at law. CJS, Negli·
gence, Vol. 65, Sec. 174, p. 854. Since the action is at law.
the Supreme Court may not alter the District Court's rul·
ing if there is substantial evidence to support the trial
court's findings. Wilson vs. Salt Lake City, 174 P. 847
See Appeal and Error, Key No. 1011 (1).
In this case, Nephi K. Kezerian, M.D., testified that

the plaintiff, Beth F. Drury, had experienced a flexion e\
tension sprain and strain of the neck with suggested loc~i
ization in posterior inter spinus ligament, C5-6, (Tr. 14.
Line 9-11), and that it was his opinion that there is a rea·
sonable medical probability that the patient did have a
stretch injury as to constitute at least an incomplete tear
of the ligament between the posterior spine process of the
C 5 and C 6, reasonably dating to the described injury or

5
(Tr. 15, Lines 1-6), and that she had re"''i\·ej a permanent loss of total bodily function incident
to the injury described of 5%, (Tr. 15, Lines 15-19). The
-;um of $4,800.00 would hardly be excessive for such an inJtll'y. See Agnew vs. Cox, 254 F.2d 263.
April 1, 1964.

CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that in tJhe lower
C'CJUrt

plaintiff's action was an action

at law

and that the

trial court's findings are supported by evidence and in fact

were based upon the preponderance of evidence, and tJhe
t1ial court did not err in the procedural steps leading to
the judgment.

Respectfully submitted,

RAY H. IVIE
Attorney for Respondent
48 North University Avenue

Provo, Utah

